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Introduction  
Corruption has been defined as, ‘the misuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (The UN 
Development Programme, 2008, p.18), and its widespread persistence remains a serious 
impediment to the achievement of sustainable and responsible economic goals. 
Contemporary global attempts to combat corruption include the, ‘UN Global Compact 
Principal 10’; the ‘PRME Working Group on Anti-Corruption in Curriculum Change’; and 
the ‘UNDP, Anti-Corruption Initiative’. The success of these initiatives however, has been 
limited as corruption has many guises and reflects perennial human vices. Furthermore, given
capitalism’s inherent dynamism it is constantly evolving, for example anti-corruption 
agencies have recently identified the burgeoning of cyber-crime as a significant problem (You
and Khagram, 2004), including the growth of on-line illegal financial flows (IFFs). 
Contemporary society however, has also experienced rising expectations for the conduct of 
economic life, resulting in demands for more ethical and responsible managers, for instance 
in terms of being proactive in pursuing explicit CSR strategies (Carroll et al, 2018, pp. 2-29). 
The causes for rising societal expectations for more emphasis on ethics and social 
responsibility in economic life are disparate, though two reasons can be clearly identified. 
First, advances in communication technology are able to more readily expose malfeasance in 
the economy to public scrutiny (Anderson, 2009; and Anderson et al, 2011). For example, the
recently exposed ‘Panama Papers’, which are a form of white-collar crime [1], demonstrated 
the ability of the web to act as a watchdog, exposing corruption to public scrutiny. Citizen 
journalist led initiatives such as ‘ipaidabribe.com’, ‘sunlightfoundation.com’ and 
‘bribespot.com’, are further examples of how communication technology is being used by 
‘netizens’ to expose corruption. It can be argued furthermore that the exposure of corruption 
contributes to demands to counter this form of criminality. 
Second, it is also plausible to argue that criticisms of the dominance of rational choice 
policies, as promoted by neo—liberalism has grown in recent years. The term neo-liberal was
promoted by the Mont Pelerin Society, founded by Heyek in 1947, to promote his ideas and 
to challenge what he considered to be the then dominance of socialist ideas, and consequent 
policies of government intervention in the economy. Recent economic history would indicate 
that this society has been very successful in promoting market-orientated economic policies, 
however it can also be argued that the success of neo-liberalism has provoked counter-
arguments. For illustration of the criticisms of the neo-liberal expansion of markets, Klein’s 
‘No Logo’ (2001) enjoyed widespread success detailing the social and environmental 
problems created by global MNCs; one of ‘No Logo’s’ most penetrating analyses, was 
focussed on the unrelenting exploitation of supply-chain employees, in accordance with neo-
liberal precepts of maximise corporate profits, without too much regard to any other 
consideration, such as the ethical perspective on having a duty of care towards employees. In 
short, the rational choice focus on self-interest, which led to a focus on ‘the bottom line’ as 
the only arbiter of success, has been deemed as inadequate by an increasing number of critics.
Inherent in these rising societal expectations furthermore, is the notion that greater effort will 
be devoted to preventing and prosecuting corruption. It is therefore imperative that business 
schools respond to rising societal expectations, in order to maintain their legitimacy, which 
can be achieved if business schools re-examine their philosophical assumptions about the 
nature, constitution and structure of reality in business and management education. Rising 
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 societal expectations, therefore present the opportunity for business schools to re-align their 
ontological assumptions that frame how the curriculum is designed, conducted and presented 
to mainstream business ethics, CSR and the anti-corruption agenda. The case presented in this
paper is one example of how innovations in pedagogy can contribute to meeting these rising 
expectations, in this instance by equipping students with an acute legal and ethical analysis of
corruption, as well as developing their understanding of its corollary, the anti-corruption 
agenda. 
This context inspired this case history of corruption, which was constructed from the recent 
egregious crimes of BLMIS (Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities) and aimed to address 
the following research question: 
 How can innovations in business school pedagogy contribute to meeting rising 
societal expectations to enhance student understanding of corruption and 
appreciation of the anti-corruption agenda?
The case also serves as an example of a large-scale global affinity and/or financial fraud. [2] 
The selected methodology was predicted on the view that case histories give students a ‘quasi
history’ to facilitate the development of their practice, or habitation. In Aristotelian terms, 
students were given the opportunity to be more virtuous, by enhancing their practical wisdom
as they engaged with the case experiences (Megone, 2002). The cardinal aim of the case was 
to develop MBA students’ understanding of corruption, within an analytical framework that 
referenced both Carroll’s CSR pyramid (1991), as well as themes developed from the rapidly 
developing literature on behavioural ethics. This theoretical framing of the case meant that 
the that the interface between the legal and ethical facets of this affinity/financial fraud could 
be examined with reference to relevant analytical frameworks. 
This paper will also detail two further justifications for constructing and delivering this case 
history: first to enhance the curriculum by stressing the centrality of ethics and CSR; and 
second to facilitate the development of more responsible MBA alumni by delineating and 
developing their understanding of the limitations of rational choice theory. In more detail, the 
first justification of the paper will identify and address the ethics/CSR deficit in business 
school theory and pedagogy, which has been identified and discussed in an extensive 
literature stream discussed below. The paper contends that there is a need to introduce 
innovative teaching material to respond to this deficit, in this instance detailing an example 
that contributes to the anti-corruption curriculum. 
The second justification of the paper will discuss the limitations and overly narrow neo-
classical economic understanding of rationality, which it will be argued frames the extant 
business school curriculum; that is, by theories that assume that individuals act in ways that 
are consistent with their own understanding of their self-interest (Friedman, 1995). The paper
will argue that the limitations of this neoclassical understanding of rationality, which 
privileges self-interest over other motivations and behaviours, were exposed in the recent 
global financial crisis (GFC), which it failed to predict, prevent, and it could be argued 
alleviate. In consequence, the business school curriculum needs to be expanded beyond the 
understanding of self-interested ‘homo economicus’, to include for example, the development 
of professional and relational values not based on-self-interest. Thus, to accord with 
Dunham’s recommendation that management theory needs to be a move away from 
‘separation thesis’, of ethics as being an external constraint, to that of being an intrinsic part 
of value creation (2009). 
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 The paper will proceed by explicating the justification for the case history, first, with 
reference to the ethics deficit in business school pedagogy and theory, and second with a 
discussion on the over-extension of rational choice premise in economics and in business and 
management theory. This paper then discusses how rational choice theory, which does not 
condone illegality, nevertheless provided an intellectual climate in which corruption 
proliferated. The paper proceeds with a discussion of the appropriateness of case histories for 
developing student understanding of corruption and the anti-corruption curriculum, to be 
followed with a description and theoretically informed analysis of the case as a pedagogical 
innovation. Finally, case reflections, conclusions are drawn from the case. 
The Ethics and Responsible Management Deficit in Business School Education 
The first justification for this case history is based on growing body of literature that draws 
attention to an ethics and responsible management deficit in the contemporary business 
school curriculum. Of course, business, commerce and ethics have always been discussed 
together, including Aristotle’s ‘Friendship based on Utility’; that is friendships based on 
pursuing an advantage (1986, p. 286). The centrality of ethics to economic life however, has 
been marginalised in the contemporary business school curriculum, as it is delivered under 
the aegis of rational choice theory. For example, the the eminent strategist, Ghoshal has 
perceptively argued that contemporary business schools place an over-emphasis on science 
and technique at the expense of teaching values, and consequently: 
‘Many of the worst excesses of recent management practices have their roots in a set 
of ideas that have emerged from business school academics over the last 30 years’ 
(2005, 75). 
At this point in the discussion it is also germane to note that there remains a debate over 
whether ethics can be taught (Ritter, 2006). Her conclusion is that there is no consensus on 
the ‘trainability of ethics content’ and that the effectiveness of ethics curriculum depends on 
the experiences and character of the individual student (2006, 153-155). Another view is that 
ethics cannot be taught as individual character development are formed before a student 
enters a HE classroom (Cragg,1997). Churchill’s (1982) view, however is persuasive as the 
identifies the difference between ethics and moral values. Ethics, as a rational and systematic 
approach to behaviour can be delivered by the curriculum, whereas moral values, develop 
earlier for an individual’s life and hence are not teachable. McCabe et al., (1991) disagrees, 
his case is that that psychological literature suggests education correlates to the enhancement 
of moral judgment. Perhaps then the best approach is to be inspired by the logic of ‘Pascal’s 
Wager’; that is while there is no definitive evidence that business schools can teach ethics and
moral values, the chance that it does makes ethics pedagogy in business schools of vital 
importance.
Furthermore, this ethics deficit is perhaps most acute on MBA programmes, as noted by 
Hunh, (2013) who makes the case that the orthodoxies in MBA pedagogy and practice restrict
the ability of managers to recognize and respond to ethical dilemmas, and consequently ‘…
resentment against the MBA is visible everywhere’ (2013). In addition, Podolny, a 
distinguished academic, has concluded that MBA programmes tend to underestimate the 
importance of ethics, typically emphasizing their over-riding ambition is to, ‘…augment 
student income’ (2009: 63). Giacalone and Wargo, have also contended that, ‘The Roots of 
the Global Financial Crisis are in Our Business Schools’ (2009). 
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 In sum, there is an extensive literature arguing that the curriculum in business schools is too 
narrowly focused on utility maximization, and hence is deficient in teaching business ethics 
and values that are also vitally important to economic activity. In response, this case aimed to 
facilitate the development of more responsible managers, able to reflect on business ethics 
and CSR, with reference to corruption, which unfortunately many students will encounter in 
their subsequent careers. Furthermore, enhancing the ethics content of MBA programs will 
address another body of criticism, which argues that the link between theory and practice in 
current MBA pedagogy is inadequate, and fails to prepare graduates for the ‘real world’ 
(Mintzberg 2004; Atwater, Kannan et al. 2008): the paper’s view is that MBA graduates will 
inevitably be faced with making management level decisions with ethical components. 
The Financial Crisis and Mainstream Rational Choice Economics
A well-known quote attributed to both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai was that, ‘it was too 
early to say’ about the consequences of the French Revolution of 1789 [3]. Whatever the 
quote’s veracity, it does capture an historical truth that the consequences of great historical 
events or turning points take time to become transparent, and consequently their significance 
can only be fully discerned over the long-term. One such recent historical turning point was 
the GFC, and it can be contended that one its consequences is to accelerate an already 
mounting demand relating to societal expectations for the market, and more generally for all 
economic activity, to be conducted in a more ethical climate. For illustration of this change in
societal expectations, one can cite the jail terms for the punishment of white-collar criminal 
for corruption has been far more onerous than before the GFC (see theme 2). This 
development denotes a societal demand reflected in the legal system that business is 
conducted strictly within the law and also within normative ethical values (Hurt, 2009). 
These more onerous prison sentences for white-collar crime are one example of the rising 
ethical expectations the economy being reflected in the more onerous legal punishment 
handed down by the courts for transgressions of these expectations. The line of reasoning is 
that the economy, which can be understood as being is embedded in broader society (Polanyi,
1944/2001), had been subject to a post-GFC set of societal expectations. As already discussed
there had been a growing body of opinion critical of neo-liberalism’s expansion of markets, 
and the precepts of rational choice economics. The GFC however, brought these criticisms 
into stark relief and exacerbated societal expectations for a more ethical economy. These 
expectations can be thought of as the unconscious assumptions, or what the Annales’ 
historians called the ‘mentalities’ that represent world views, and which have expanded post-
crash from previous neo-liberal economic orthodoxies that viewed ethics, not as integral to 
business activity; but rather as an add-on, or even as an impediment to the all-important 
‘bottom line’: termed the separation thesis. In short, the zeitgeist of the era immediately 
preceding the financial crisis was framed by egoist doctrines of self-interest, taken from a 
narrow economic understanding of rationality, developed from the late fifties onwards as part 
of a ‘Neo-classical Revival’ (Simon, 1978,). Pfeffer (2005) was therefore correct to identify 
that Economics had been over-extended in the social sciences and that its assumptions of self-
interest tended to become self-fulfilling. In consequence, a highly abstracted interpretation of 
unfettered competition was placed as society’s organizing principle, resulting in what Perry 
calls a ‘liberal view of ethics’ (1992). This rational orthodoxy understood individuals as 
calculative and wholly self-interested; its antecedent are arguably in Hobbes gloomy view of 
human nature. The rational perspective furthermore, can be understood as integral to a 
triumph of economic ideology justifying a particular set of (neo-liberal) economic views. In 
Lane’s words: ‘I think rationality is inserted to justify not explain the market’ (1996: 112). 
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 This is also an ongoing debate, about the nature and purpose of economics and the closely 
related domain of business and management, and a key area of contention is the narrowness 
of the economic understanding of rationality. Economic rationality is a meta-theory for 
motivation and analysis, which can be summarized as the view that individuals act in ways 
that are consistent with their understanding of their own self-interest; in the syntax that 
rational actors act in ways to maximize their utility. It can also be understood as an extreme 
form of methodological individualism (Ferguson and Mansbach, 2004), which has 
encouraged the wholesale de-regulation and privatization of economies. 
Given these limitations of orthodox Economics, it is unsurprising that ontological questions, 
such as what is it, ‘to think like an economist’, and the closely related question of what is, ‘to 
think like a management theorist’ have become more contested, which is to be welcomed as 
the extant ontology, has hitherto mitigated against sustainable education and ethics pedagogy 
(Painter-Morland, 2014; Hunh, 2104). 
Furthermore, post-GFC there is an opportunity to develop the ontology of business and 
management as regards to ethics. Ontology refers to the assumptions made about reality; 
what therefore management education is, and consequently these ontological assumptions 
frame research focus, design and presentation. Crane for example, has noted that business 
ethics and pedagogy is biased towards a materialist ontology, which has result in a 
preponderance of quantitative research in the positivist tradition (1999). Rossouw has also 
discussed that research in business ethics is either premised on materialist or on idealist 
ontologies (2002). In addition, Painter-Morland has analysed that business schools tend to 
have an organizational profit-interest ontology that can work to the detriment of society, as 
their view of well-being is too narrowly linked to the wealth. This purely economic view 
moreover. leads to ethics and its domain being peripheral (2014). Her view is that a 
rationalist, reductionist mind-set serves business in times of stability, but different capabilities
are needed when confronted by ambiguity (2014, p. 70). The post-GFC is just such a time of 
ambiguity, and hence there is a requirement for ontological assumptions to be expanded 
beyond premises of neo-liberalism. 
It can also be contended that major historical events, such as the recent GFC, can serve to 
redefine ontological, epistemological and pedagogical assumptions. For example, Khurana in 
his history of MBAs, asserts following WW2 a belief took hold that the conflict had been 
successfully waged with the application of ‘management science’ that could be successfully 
applied to post-war civilian business and management. This led to the re-configuration of 
business schools; ‘…on a rigorous, scientific basis as the primary mechanism through which 
a profession of management could be created’ (2007: 271).  This paper view is that GFC, 
which to many observers was attributable to self-interested MBA alumni (Giacolone and 
Wargo, 2009), has created a crisis of identity and purpose in business schools and therefore 
requires a re-configuration on the scale that took place after WW2.  Therefore, one 
justification for this paper’s innovation in behavioral ethics is to contribute to enhancing 
MBA pedagogy, including curriculum development, ultimately to produce graduates, ‘…that 
enhance the integrity of the business world’ (Koljatic and Sliwa, 2014).
Rational Choice Theory and White-Collar Crime 
Rational choice economics recommends the pursuit of self-interest, but not criminality. 
Williamson however, has noted that real economic actors combine self-interest with 
opportunism, (1975), and Granovetter has also observed that: 
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 ‘…a peculiar assumption of modern economic theory is that One’s economic 
interest is pursued only by comparatively gentlemanly means. The Hobbesian
question-how can it be that those who pursue their own interest do not do so 
mainly by force and fraud-is finessed by this conception. Yet as Hobbes saw so clearly
there is nothing in the intrinsic meaning of ‘self-interest’ that excludes force or fraud’ 
(1985: 488). 
Thus, the question arises of whether the idealised ‘homo-economicus’, who acted to maximise
their individual utility, within a framework that under-emphasised the economic importance 
of ethics, was prone to criminality, in the syntax as an extreme form of self-interested ‘ends-
means rationality’. Furthermore, the philosopher Mary Midgely, a perceptive critic of the 
neoclassical economic revival, considers that this commercial ideology was shaped by an 
excessive individualism, combining counter culture’s anarchistic anti-authoritarianism, 
blended with unrestrained capitalism, in which self-choice was pre-eminent (2010).  One can 
therefore speculate whether excessive individualism and anarchistic ant-authoritarianism 
could predispose to illegality. 
This paper ’s view is that the ethical limitations of the economic understanding of rationality, 
which privileges self-interest, were exposed in the GFC, which arguably was caused by the 
narrow pursuit of short-term profit maximization, which if not criminal was reckless. The 
ethical limitations of economic rationality were also exposed in the numerous recent 
examples of white-collar crime, including the scandals at Enron, Arthur Anderson, 
WorldCom, and Tyco International as well as this case example of BLMIS. Many of the 
white-collar criminals indicted in these crimes were MBA graduates, which has led Swanson 
and Frederick (2003) to develop a very convincing analysis, which affirms that business 
schools, with their rational choice framed curriculum have been ‘unwitting accomplices in 
corporate crimes’ (p. 24).  In sum critics of business schools contend that their scientific 
managerialism, is producing venal and untrustworthy graduates (Congleton, 2014, p. 170). 
For illustration, research has confirmed that business students, including MBAs, are more 
likely to cheat than students in other disciplines (McCabe, Butterfield and Trevino, 2006, p. 
300). Frank has also written extensively that students and professors exposed to rational 
choice theory are more likely to behave in accordance with its self-interested maxims (1988). 
Case Literature 
The literature that analyzed this case study exercise was drawn from Carroll’s influential 4 
levels of CSR (1979), later recast as a pyramid model (1991); and from the developing 
behavioral ethics literature (Tevino et al, 2006). The reason for this selection was that the case
history depicted white-collar corruption involved both legal and ethical transgressions, which 
both of these literatures address. 
First: “Carroll ’s CSR Pyramid [that] is probably the most well-known model of CSR …” 
(Visser 2006). According to Carroll CSR encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and 
discretionary (philanthropic) expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in 
time (Carroll 1979, 1991). In Carroll’s words:
‘The purpose of the pyramid was to single out the definitional aspect of CSR and to 
illustrate the building block nature of the four-part framework (Carroll, 2016, p.4). 
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 Furthermore, Carroll averred in terms of understanding each type of responsibility society:
 requires economic and legal responsibility,
 expects ethical responsibility,  
 expects/desires philanthropic responsibility.
Carroll has also recently written a paper taking another look at his pyramid of CSR and noted
its enduring importance to scholars, perhaps because ‘Ethics Permeate the Pyramid’ (Ibid, p. 
6). Thus, although the ethical responsibility is depicted in the pyramid as a separate category 
of CSR, nevertheless ethics are significant throughout each of the pyramid’s four layers. 
Furthermore, for this case it is worth emphasising the second tier of the pyramid, what 
Carroll termed the ‘Legal Responsibilities’. These legal responsibilities set out the minimal 
grounds under which businesses are expected to operate and function and can be thought of 
as ‘…society’s view of “codified ethics” in that they articulate fundamental notions of fair 
business practices as established by lawmakers at federal, state and local levels’ (2016, p. 3): 
these are the minimum ground rules.  Carroll further stressed that in ‘Legal Responsibility’ 
category, it should be acknowledged that most laws and regulations were created based upon 
some ethical reasoning and thus once formalized they represented “codified ethics” for that 
society (ibid). The relationship between legal and ethical responsibilities is therefore explicit 
and will be commented on in the case analysis. There are of course inevitably limitations to 
any comprehensive approach to CSR, as noted by Robinson and Dowson (2012, pp. 210-
211). The pyramid of CSR however, remains an appropriate interpretative tool as it provides 
a robust analysis that can be applied for different stakeholders, as will be demonstrated in this
case of pedagogical innovation. 
The second literature applied to analyse the case was taken from the developing behavioural 
ethics area of research, which has recently rise to prominence as pioneered by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman (2011), arguably as an alternative to rational choice 
economics. This paper takes an understanding of behavioral ethics as the study of ‘individual 
behavior that is subject to or judged according to generally accepted moral norms of 
behavior’ (Trevino et al, 2006, p. 952).  Behavioural Ethics rejects economic-rationalism, and
coalesces modern psychology and economics to establish a new perspective of behavioral and
experimental economics. This approach to understanding economic life offers an alternative 
economic epistemology and analysis, based on psychological insights, including heuristics, 
biases, anchoring effects, narrowing, framing and excessive coherence. 
Furthermore, this paper ’s conceptual lens will focus on sub-theme of ‘reactions to unethical 
behavior’. This theme was first identified in a special issue of Business Ethics Quarterly (De 
Cremer, et al, 2010), and it has been developed with a theoretical focus into deontic justice; 
that is justice is valued for its own sake (Cropanzano, Goldman; and Folger, 2003; Folger et 
al, 2005). It is also worth noting that according to Rupp and Bell (2010, p. 90) the 
antecedents of deontic justice are in Kantian ethics’ categorical imperatives. In conclusion, 
students were asked to consider the BLMIS case with reference to behavioural ethics themes 
including deontological notions of justice.
Methodology: Case Histories in Behavioural Ethics Education
The case study method is well established in business ethics education (Rendtorff: 2015) and 
scholars have argued persuasively that this methodology has the potential to facilitate the aim
in terms of developing understanding of corruption and anti-corruption, as well as to enhance 
student’s ethical awareness, and moral character. For illustration, according Rendtorff the 
case methodology has the facility, ‘…for developing ethical judgment in the tension between 
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 theory and practice’ (2015, p.49). Rendtorff also states that case studies can, ‘… improve 
personal integrity and the ability to choose right action’ (Ibid, p. 54). 
It is also notable that Megone (2002) has discussed the case history methodology with 
reference to Aristotelian virtue ethics. Megone makes the link between case histories and the 
acquisition of ‘phronesis’, or practical wisdom that requires experience. According to 
Megone one way to use a case history is as a presentation of experience. He also contends 
that case histories can lead to the acquisition of virtuous motivation, so that, ‘…they can be 
used in a way which will affect the character development of the student (ibid, p. 173).  Thus,
the case methodology was appropriate for this research question as it aimed to develop the 
student understanding of corruption by presenting them with the ‘experience’ of one instance 
of corruption. Furthermore, character development in being able and willing to promote anti-
corruption would also be an entirely appropriate outcome of this research. 
To conclude, this research used the qualitative case method (Stake, 1995; and Yin, 2004, 2010
and 2011), to investigate lived experience from the viewpoint of those being studied. 
Moreover, following Chell’s recommendation the case history was chosen, ‘…for analytical 
purposes to produce insight into the phenomena in question’ (2008): the phenomena in 
question in this instance was corruption. In sum, this research aimed to provide the case 
history ‘experience’, for students to reflect and conduct an in-depth analysis with reference to
Carroll’s pyramid of CSR (1991) and behavioural ethics theory. 
Outline of the Case Delivery
The sample comprised 40 MBA students split into 2 classes taking an elective module in 
business ethics. These were full-time students, and all had a first degree, though the majority 
were not in cognate disciplines: 18 had first degrees in business and management related 
disciplines, with 22 in other disciplines. The work experience of these students was varied, 
however all of them had at least 4 years in a managerial position. The nationalities of the 
students were also varied, and the majority 28/40 hailing from non-Anglophone countries. 
Overall, the students were characterized by their diversity of experiences and backgrounds
Prior to this case, the student cohort had been given lectures and seminars that had introduced
them to the leading business ethics theories as follows: Aristotle’s virtue ethics focussing on 
the character of the individual; Kant’s duty based ethics; Bentham’s utilitarianism; and 
Carroll’s CSR theories. Students therefore had a grounding in theories relevant to business 
and management. A number of students were aware of the BLMIS fraud, however none of 
them were experts in the case, which was fortuitous as it meant that they approached the case 
history without any case specific preconceptions.
The case was introduced with reference to Carroll’s CSR pyramid categories, and to 
behavioral ethics theory. Affinity fraud was also defined (Perri and Brody, 2011, p. 34).
Students were then supplied with a brief chronology of the fraud and were also advised of 
various sources detailing the fraud, with the most comprehensive introduction being at: 
‘Vanity Fair’, April 2009, available at: www.  vanityfair  .com/news/2009/.../bernard-  madoff  - . 
The next step was to give students an overview of the court documents, which are available at
www.justice.gov/.../united-states-  v  -bernard-l-  madoff  -and-related-  cases  . Students were also 
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 directed to read, ‘Sentencing Transcript dated June 29, 2009’, 47, and Madoff’s court 
Allocution, all easily accessible on the web. 
In this case history, the protagonist of the BLMIS affinity fraud were introduced as follows: 
 The perpetrators: Madoff and family and other employees and associates of BLMIS
 The victims/collaborators or investors (depending on the viewpoint adopted)
 Markopolis: chief whistle-blower 
 Judge Denny Chinn
 Defence Attorney: Ira Lee Sorkin
Students were organised into self-selected groups and asked to research and then prepare a 
twenty-minute group presentation based on one of Carroll’s 4 CSR categories. They were 
also required to reference behavioural ethics literature. Various additional sources relating to 
the case were also distributed to each group, as detailed below. 
Findings 
Theme One: Carroll’s Economic Responsibilities, and Behavioural Ethics’ and ‘Econs 
and Humans’
This theme required students to consider BLMIS with reference to Carroll’s responsibility for
business to be profitable category, which sits at the base of CSR pyramid. This theme also 
required that students compare the behavioural ethics ‘econ and humans’ with the rational 
agent model. 
The students noted that in terms of Carroll’s economic responsibilities, prior to the fraud’s 
exposure BLMIS was adjudged by most observers to be a stellar success, with very 
favourable rates of annual return for investors. Therefore, to many, though not all, 
contemporary observers BLMIS was apparently meeting its requirements for making profits 
for all of its stakeholders. The students however, reflected that this apparent economic 
success was a chimera, and the firm was on the contrary defrauding most of its key 
stakeholders, the investors. It is notable, furthermore that a large number of investors made 
considerable profits from their BLMIS investments, with a consistent 10-15% annual return 
before they chose to withdraw their investments. It is however, difficult to verify the precise 
number of this fortuitous group of investors, as the ‘winners’ in BLMIS fraud have been 
unforthcoming, perhaps to avoid charges of collusion in Madoff’s crimes (Ardelund, 2009, p. 
269). 
In the presentations, the student groups came to the view that it was not possible to separate 
economic responsibilities from ethics, which reflects Carroll’s interpretation of the CSR, as 
he explicitly states that ethics permeates each level of the pyramid (2016, p.5). The students 
understood that the economic responsibilities of BLMIS were undermined by its unethical 
operating strategies.
Kahneman’s comments on ‘econs v humans’ were also discussed to highlight the limitations 
of economic rationality, which was contrasted with the behavioral ethics perspective (2011). 
Students were informed of Kahneman’s view that the only test of rationality in economics is 
whether a person’s beliefs and preferences are consistent in a critical discussion of the 
rational agent model (2011, pp. 411-415). To explore the validity of this observation, 
additional sources were introduced to the students, including references to Granovetter’s 
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 socio-economics assumptions (1985, p. 488). Developing this theme student groups also 
mused on whether the most transparent examples of rationalists in the market place are white-
collar criminals, who act in accordance with complete self-interestedness. Bernie Madoff for 
illustration, can be characterised as an extreme rationalist who ruthlessly strove to promote 
his own interests (self-interested utility optimisation) without regard to any non-rational 
(moral/ethical) frameworks. This discussion was inconclusive with a number of students 
stating that the market demanded complete self-interest in-order to survive and prosper. 
Madoff however, was also interpreted as operating beyond the maxims of rational choice, as 
the theory advocating economic self-interest assumes that the law is not broken. Most 
students stated that it self-interested behaviour did not include breaking the law, as the risks 
of punishment were too onerous to justify illegality on a rational cost/benefit analysis.
Theme Two: Carroll’s Legal Responsibilities, and Behavioural Ethics’ Deontic Justice 
Carroll’s legal responsibilities category is most germane to any analysis of this case. Students
focussed on Carroll’s expectations that business should ‘fulfil all their legal obligations to 
societal stakeholders’. Students noted that Madoff, akin to many conmen, finessed away his 
legal obligations to his investors, for example by asserting from prison that they were 
complicit in BLMIS’ crimes, as in his view they were all prepared ‘to look the other way’. In 
his words, he: ‘Made wealthy people wealthier’ (Lewis, 2012, p. 164). The students were 
convinced however, that BLMIS did not fulfil its legal obligations, whatever the aspersions 
levelled by Madoff at the motivations of his investors. The students were also convinced that 
BLMIS had failed to meet the expectations that business provides ‘…goods and services that 
at least meet minimal legal requirements (Carroll, 2016, p. 3). This was taken as self-evident 
as the BLMIS fraud persisted as it had been expert at avoiding its legal requirements. Madoff,
for illustration was expert at manipulating the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
for his own advantage to stop or divert any investigations into the 13th floor of the Lipstick 
Building that accommodated BLMIS (Arvedlund, 2012, pp. 209-219). 
The legal theme also required the students to consider whether Madoff had been harshly 
treated by the court. Students were informed that on the 29th June 2009 at the sentencing trial,
Ira Lee Sorkin, speaking for all of Madoff‘s attorneys, acceded that their client was a  ‘deeply
flawed individual’, nonetheless he had continued by pleading for leniency. Sorkin made the 
case that Madoff had ‘turned himself in’, and made a full confession that expressed regret: his
client had also agreed to fully cooperate with the recovery of investments. The defence 
attorney further stressed that they had based their request for a 12-year sentence on the 
average length of sentencing for previous acts of severe fraud. As Sorkin elaborated, a 
sentence of 12 years for the 71 years old Madoff could be just short of a life sentence, with 
the slim prospect of his client living out his final years, ‘impoverished and alone’ and would 
signal that justice would not be swayed by ‘mob vengeance’. Judge Denny Chinn however, 
remained unimpressed and specifically dismissed the notion of ‘life expectancy analysis’, 
preferring to hand down, in his words, a ‘symbolic verdict’ of 150 years or 1, 800 months for 
the $65 billion investment fraud: Madoff would be 221 before he could be considered for 
release on November 14th 2139.  Judge Chinn elaborated that the verdict was symbolic in 
terms of, retribution, deterrence and for symbolism as the victims came from all walks of life 
(Sentencing Transcript dated June 29, 2009”, p. 47.  www.justice.gov/.../united-states-v-
bernard-l-madoff-and-related-cases) . 
It was further emphasized to the students that Madoff was not the only white collar criminal 
exposed by the down turn after the GFC, as a number of Ponzi/bubble schemes were soon 
uncovered and prosecuted, with each of the perpetrators handed down long prison sentences. 
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 The most high-profile of these Ponzi schemes were those perpetrated by Tom Peters who 
swindled $3.65 billion, sentenced to 50 years in 2008; R. A. Stanford who swindled $8 
billion, and was sentenced to 110 years in 2009; and S Rothstein who swindled $1.2 billion, 
and was sentenced to 50 years in 2010. These sentences contrast for their severity with earlier
cases of high profile white-collar criminals.  For example, in 2003 Jordon Belfort (The Wolf 
of Wall Street) was sentenced to 39 months in prison after pleading guilty to ten counts of 
money laundering and securities fraud, though he only served 22 months. Another well 
-known white collar criminal was Ivan Boesky, sentenced in 1986 to 3 years: he served 2 and 
half years. Boesky’s plea bargaining led to another well-known fraudster, Michael Milken 
being convicted of 98 counts of racketeering and fraud. Milken was given a sentence of 10 
years, but was paroled after serving 22 months. 
It was stressed that these sentences were not an anomaly associated with the late twentieth 
and first eight years of the twentieth century, but rather were consistent with the sentencing of
white-collar criminals throughout the twentieth century. For example, the white-collar 
criminal who most resembles Madoff was Richard Whitney, who served as president of the 
New York Stock Exchange from 1930 to 1935. His financial fraud was prosecuted in 1938 
and he received a sentence of 5 to 10 years, being released after serving just over 3 years.  
The prison term of Carlo Ponzi, whose name is usually mentioned in any paper about 
embezzlement, provides another example. Ponzi was sentenced to 5 years, for his eponymous
embezzlement in 1920, however, he as released in 1924, after which he launched another 
criminal scheme based on land fraud in Florida. 
In sum, sentences for high profile financial crime has been more draconian in recent times, 
and students were directed to consider this development from a deontic ‘justice for its own 
sake’ perspective. Did Madoff receive a jail tariff out of kilter with his crimes? One view is 
that he was being punished as the embodiment, and at a stretch, as one of the perpetrators of 
the GFC. The students’ response to this information was mild surprise at the ‘leniency’ of the 
earlier sentences handed out to white-collar criminals. They also averred, that given the 
extent and consequences of Madoff’s crimes, Judge Denny Chinn had passed down a suitably
chastising jail term. Thus, the term of 150 years was according to their analysis entirely 
warranted. Conversely one student argued vigorously that Madoff had been harshly treated, 
who he considered had been ‘scapegoated’.
Theme Three: Carroll’s Ethical Responsibilities, and Behavioural Ethics, Victims or 
Collaborators? 
According to Carroll ‘society expects businesses to operate and conduct their affairs in an 
ethical fashion’ (2016, p 3).  The students were unanimous in their view that BLMIS has 
failed to be ethically responsible, and further had caused damage to the ethical fabric of 
society. The example that exercised students to an extreme was Madoff’s targeting of 
charities to ‘fleece’ (Arvedlund, 2012, p 272), which students found especially repugnant. 
The information relevant for theme 2 was also discussed in terms of investors being victims 
or collaborator. Students were informed that the narrative favoured by Madoff was that the 
investors were complicit in the fraud as they must have known the consistent returns were too
good to be true. This understanding is typical of white-collar criminals and in criminology is 
known as ‘neutralizing theory’. Thus, criminals assuage their conscience and rationalize their 
unethical behaviour by blaming the victims (Haugh, 2014).  For illustration, according to a 
recent prison interview, despite his apology in court Madoff remains unrepentant, holding fast
to the view that his investors knew his returns were too good to be true and thus were his 
willing partners in the fraud. According to a fellow inmate Madoff is also increasingly angry 
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 about his incarceration, stating:  *** my victims. I carried them for 20 years and now I’m 
doing 150 years’ (Somaiya, Newsweek, 2010).
The student view was nuanced, and they reached the conclusion that there were a range of 
different types of investors. Many they concluded could not be termed anything other than 
victims. For example, the investors in the numerous ‘feeder funds’ into BLMIS, were not in 
many instances even aware that they had any connection with Madoff’s firm till informed of 
the connection in the media. At the other extreme, there were big investors who appeared to 
be very well informed and used their information to exit the fund with excellent returns. 
Somewhere between these two extremes were investors who were prepared to forgo due 
diligence on the basis of receiving a very attractive dividend. as one observer put it:
‘To stay in Madoff’ game, they agreed to cooperate with his deceptions. They honored 
his request to not talk about him or to tell others that he was managing their money. 
They didn’t do due diligence’ (Arvedlund, 2009, p. 220).
Theme Four: Carroll’s Philanthropic Responsibilities, and Behavioural Ethics:  
Compensation or Just Deserts 
Carroll has noted that:
 
‘…most companies engage in philanthropy as a practical way to demonstrate their 
good citizenship. This is done to enhance or augment the company’ s reputation and 
not necessarily for noble or self-sacrificing reasons (2016, p. 4).
The student view was the same as the one expressed under theme 3 that philanthropy and the 
various charitable activities that Madoff indulged in had been strategic moves to bolster his 
reputation, which was a key intangible asset to gaining the trust of his investors.  Madoff, for 
illustration donated heavily to ethnic (Jewish) charities, became a member of the Board of 
trustees for Yeshiva University, and proclaimed his devotion to the Jewish religion and 
culture. Madoff was also perceptive enough to recognize that charity, and more generally 
philanthropic activities in his own community were an excellent opportunity to develop his 
feeder networks. This approach fitted in with Madoff’s preferred sales pitch of avoiding 
financial or ‘capital introduction’ parties, which would be full of financially savvy investors, 
who would too many awkward questions. Instead, he preferred to target fellow 
philanthropists by word of mouth recommendations, and there was a concerted effort by 
Madoff and other members of his family to court the charity circuit, sitting on the boards of 
many charities and donating money to many others. This networking gave Madoff two main 
paybacks. First, it allowed him access to high society that added luster to his brand: it made 
him more respectable and consequently credible. Second, it allowed him to aggressively 
market his products to gullible charity commissioners and hence provided a lucrative source 
of investors. The success of the Madoff’s in convincing charities to invest an be gauged by 
the reforms recommended to charitable foundations, reforming their size and structure in 
order to decrease their reliance of ‘personal ties’ (Jagpal & Craig, 2009) [4].
From a behavioural ethics perspective, students were asked to reflect on the actions of 
investors, who were vigorous in trying to establish a narrative in which they were entirely 
innocent victims, perhaps to assist them in their ‘clawback’ aims to recover assets from the 
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 authorities (Hurt, 2009; Lewis, 2012; and Cassell and Erez, 2011). This related to 
philanthropic responsibilities in terms of whether there was an expectation that the authorities
should recompense the investors for their losses. 
 
Students were asked to review and reflect on the victim impact statements, which 
personalized and detailed the impact of crime, in criminology this is termed therapeutic 
justice.  In the United States V Bernard L. Madoff, 167 substantial statements were 
submitted, from which the prosecution chose to submit 113 substantial statements, with 9 
permitted to speak at the sentencing trial. The statements therefore comprise the views of 
only a fraction of the defrauded.  For example, financial institutions, which suffered the 
biggest losses, such as Banco Santander ($2.87 billion) and Bank Medici ($2.1 billion), as 
well as charities and celebrity investors, did not submit any statements. The statements are 
therefore unrepresentative, but valuable for their role in ‘shaping the Madoff narrative’ in the 
sphere of public opinion. For example, the statements articulated an acute sense of Madoff’s 
treachery, not only to individual investors but more so to the wider community, as one 
investor stated: 
‘ What Bernard L Madoff did far transcends the loss of money. It involves his betrayal
of the virtues of people hold dearest-love, friendship, trust-and all so he can eat at the
finest restaurants, stay at the most luxurious resorts, and travel on yachts and private 
jets. Ha has truly earned his reputation for being the most despised person to in 
America today (New York v Madoff, sentencing transcript” p 20. Available at: 
www.justice.gov/.../united-states-  v  -bernard-l-  madoff  -and-related-  cases  ).  
For this theme students considered whether the investors should be regarded as victims or 
willing collaborators, and also whether they had a deontic justice case to receive 
compensation for their losses. Their response was that it was very difficult to assess the level 
of collaboration of the investors in the fraud. Thus, they reached the nuanced conclusion that 
a number had been victims, perhaps the majority had been passive collaborators, while a 
minority had been active participants in the fraud. 
Reflections on Case
The research question investigated whether a case history could enhance MBA student’s 
theoretical understanding of global corruption, as well as developing their moral awareness, 
character and facility for self-reflection. The implication of the question was that by meeting 
these enhancements the case would contribute to students becoming more responsible 
managers in their future careers. The researcher is convinced moreover, based on the student 
presentations and classroom debates, that the students gained knowledge and understanding, 
as well as the facility to analyse real-world business examples of global corruption and anti-
corruption agendas. The researcher also adjudged that students were also able to develop their
moral awareness, character and facility for self-reflection. Of course, changes to these ethics 
related values and intangibles are difficult to prove, as they are transcendental and therefore 
internal and subjective to each student. The researchers view however, is that using 
behavioural ethics argot, the case ‘nudged’ students to develop appreciation of corruption, as 
well developing their moral awareness, character and facility for self-reflection. 
 
Overall, based on the high- level of student engagement with the case, as well as on the 
excellent quality of their presentations it is reasonable to assert that this innovative case 
history developed student understanding and appreciation of corruption. This deeper and 
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 more nuanced understanding was framed within Carroll’s CSR pyramid and behavioural 
ethics themes, which can be summarised as follows: 
 Students demonstrated that they understood that the legal case against BLMIS was 
also an ethical case. This view was evinced in the depth of discussion and in the 
conclusion expressed in student presentations.
 Carroll’s ‘Economic Legal, Ethical and Philanthropic’ responsibilities were discussed 
with reference to key stakeholders, and student responses indicated that they had 
developed appreciation of the integrated nature of each of Carroll’s categories.
 Students group presentations expressed nuanced understanding that corruption is 
complicated. For instance, in terms of perceptively discussing whether the investors 
were victims or collaborators in the fraud.
 In terms of behavioural ethics themes the first theme produced a number of 
stimulating responses that argued that the rational model was unrealistic and needed 
to be augmented with a greater appreciation of  ethical framework and moral 
awareness. One excellent presentation concluded that Madoff was acting in 
accordance with rational strictures of motivation and behaviour. This group developed
the theme to consider the view that there is no reason for a rationalist to exclude force 
or fraud, other than the risk of being apprehended and punished. It was noted by these 
students however, that in economic behaviour there are many instances when 
individuals could use force or fraud with little chance of being caught, but choose not 
to: hence the ‘policing mechanism’ did not explain their actions. An alternative 
understanding discussed is that the economy needs ethical values to function. 
 The second behavioural ethics theme elicited different student response but the 
majority response was that Madoff’s punishment was suitably harsh and should not be
reduced. The majority view was that he deserved to be punitively punished, one 
student did though make a spirited case that Madoff’s tariff was more than given for 
crimes considered more heinous, and hence needed to be revisited. 
 The third and fourth behavioural ethics themes produced the liveliest debates, with 
contrasting and strongly held opinions expressed for and against the BLMIS’ 
investors, as either victims or collaborators. No agreement was reached on these 
themes, which provided a good illustration of the contested nature of business ethics 
and the complicated nature of corruption.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The conclusion is that case histories, in this instance using archival sources taken from the 
court records, have the potential to enhance teaching and learning in business ethics and 
responsible management education. Furthermore, innovations in business school pedagogy, 
such as this case history, can contribute to enhancing the ontological, epistemological and 
pedagogical assumptions in business schools, with the aim of placing more significance on 
ethics and responsible values. The outcome of these philosophical innovations will be to 
facilitate a more attuned perception of corruption and the anti-corruption agenda.
The paper has also emphasised that the GFC has created the opportunity for expanding the 
ontology of business schools, which would facilitate an epistemology open to more inter-
disciplinary pluralist approaches to business ethics. Hitherto, business ethics theory has been 
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 limited to Kantianism, Utilitarianism (Act/Rule), Egoism, Social Contract Theory, Virtue 
Ethics, Discourse Ethics, Post-Modern Ethics and Ethics of Care (Spence, 2014). Post-GFC 
this epistemology can also be expanded. In this case examples of this crossing of divides was 
achieved with inputs from, criminology, jurisprudence, under-utilised areas of ethics and 
business history.
Furthermore, this pedagogical research set out to acknowledge and respond to broader 
societal trends of raising expectations, as a consequence of the changed ethical climate, 
which is perhaps the only positive consequence of the GFC. It follows that business schools 
need to re-focus their attention to foster greater levels of legal, ethical values and morality in 
their students. It is also worth noting that such a development would be return to the moral 
roots of economics, as Adam Smith was above all a moral philosopher (Patterson, 2000, p. 
39-56) who wrote about moral philosophy and empathy in the economy in his, ‘Theory of 
Moral Philosophy’ (1759). It would also be return to earlier understandings of business 
education, as its original purpose as established at Wharton School in 1881 was, ‘…to serve 
the broader interests of society’ (Kharuna, 2007). 
Finally, a limitation of this research is that it is reporting on one instance of a classroom 
delivery of the case study. In consequence, a recommendation for future research is for CSR 
and ethics focussed educationalist to conduct similar case study teaching to add to and 
complement the conclusions reached in this paper.  
 
Notes 
1. See, Sunderland, who first used the term ‘White-Collar Crime’ in a 1939 paper. Also, 
see Smith et al, (2011, p.7) for a discussion of the dispute between criminologist who 
define the area very precisely, as opposed to those who understand it as a broad inter-
disciplinary subject focused on criminal behaviour. This paper will take the latter, 
broad definition as detailed by Payne (2012, pp. 435-462).
2. ‘Affinity fraud refers to investment scams that prey upon members of an identifiable 
groups, such as racial, religious and ethnic communities, the elderly, professional 
groups, or other types of identifiable groups. ‘The fraudsters who promote affinity 
scams frequently are-or pretend to be- members of the group’ (Perri and Brody, 2011, 
p.34). 
3. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai may have been referring to civil disobedience in Paris in
1968.
4. Madoff targeted charities for his fraud, but he never accepted any investments from 
his favourite charity: ‘Lymphoma Research Foundation’. His son Andy suffered from 
lymphoma and the Madoff’s were generous donators, over $1 million in 2007. See, 
Levensen, E. (2008). ‘One Madoff charity goes Unscathed’, Fortune, December 17th. 
Available at: ‘archive.fortune.com’. 
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